Abstract-We are interested in exploring how to virtualize network switches in order to create multiple logical switches from one physical switch. The motivation behind this is to be able to support multiple research-and-education (R&E) projects by offering each of them a logical switch that could coexist with other R&E projects' logical switches, so that each would have the equivalent of their own switch. We propose an approach for virtualizing off-the-shelf Ethernet switches that have builtin support for creating isolated bandwidth partitions on their data-plane interfaces. Our solution is to implement two software modules that are run external to the switches, a slice scheduler and a Slice Administration Controller (SAC). We applied our approach to virtualizing a specific Ethernet switch, i.e., the Force10 E600 model. We describe our implementation, and show how a slowdown of 3% to 26%, based on the type of administrative command issued, is experienced when using the SAC.
I. INTRODUCTION
Virtualization is a central concept in the NSF initiative to create a Global Environment for Network Innovations (GENI) [1] . As the GENI testbed is expected to have both host systems and network switches/routers (among other entities), techniques are needed for virtualizing both hosts and switches/routers. The concept of virtualizing a computer host to create virtual machines has been widely implemented. There are several techniques for virtualizing hosts in both commercial and research-and-education (R&E) communities such as VMware [2] , Virtual Server [3] , Xen [4] , PlanetLab [5] , etc.
Two types of virtualizable switches/routers, which fall at opposite ends of the flexibility/performance spectrum, are: (i) software-based switches/routers created using off-the-shelf servers, as implemented in the Virtual Network Infrastructure (VINI) project [6] , and (ii) a hardware-based high-speed router/switch with Advanced Telecommunications Computing Architecture (ATCA) components and network processors as proposed in [7] .
We propose a switch/router virtualization solution that lies between these two extremes. It is based on using off-theshelf switches/routers and poses only one requirement on these switches, i.e., that the switch/router has built-in capabilities to support isolated slivers (bandwidth partitions) on its dataplane interfaces. Ideally to create multiple logical switches from one physical switch, in addition to support for separable slivers on the data-plane, the switch should have built-in capabilities to support multiple, separable (a) control-plane instances, e.g., routing protocol and signaling protocol processes, (b) management-plane instances, e.g., Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agents with partitioned MIBs, and (c) Command-Line Interface (CLI) processing instances. In our proposed solution for switch/router virtualization, software external to the switch is used to partition the control plane, management plane and CLI administrative-access, thus requiring built-in support for only data-plane partitioning.
In Section II, we explain our motivation for carrying out this work, and contrast the goals of the VINI, ATCA and our approach to switch/router virtualization. In Section III, we describe our overall virtualization approach, and then focus on one aspect, the sharing of the administrative CLI. Section IV describes our implementation of a software module called the Slice Administration Controller (SAC), and reports on obtained measurements. We conclude the paper in Section V.
II. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK

A. Initial drivers
Our initial interest in virtualization came about when we wanted to run some experiments on Internet2's Hybrid Optical Packet Infrastructure (HOPI) [8] testbed while another research group was simultaneously using the testbed. HOPI is an experimental testbed available for use by networking and other scientific researchers. When considered in the context of HOPI, GENI, and similar situations in which multiple researchers are using the same physical infrastructure, there is a strong motivation to virtualize a node in order to allow researchers to operate without interfering with each other.
The HOPI network consists of Force10 E600 nodes deployed at five cities, Washington, New York, Chicago, Seattle and Los Angeles. The Force10 E600 does meet our requirement of built-in support for sliver isolation on its data-plane interfaces. Therefore, we used this model in an implementation of our virtualization approach.
The E600 equipment can be configured to operate as an Ethernet switch ("layer-2 (L2)" switch), an IP router ("layer-3 (L3)" router), or a combination thereof. In our studies on the feasibility of virtualization of this model, we configured it strictly as an Ethernet switch. This was partly because this was the intended mode of operation on the HOPI network, and also because the set of functions/features that need to be virtualized is much smaller in this mode, making it the better first-step choice.
B. Broader motivation and related work
In this section, we compare goals and usability of four different approaches to switch/router virtualization. In addition to the VINI, ATCA router and our approach, we describe commercial interests in virtualization.
In VINI, the goal is to provide researchers access to virtualized high-end servers for a simultaneous testing of new protocols and services. Reference [6] mentions the possibility of eventually using "programmable hardware devices" instead of servers. A VINI implementation on PlanetLab runs XORP [9] routing software and Click packet forwarding software [10] . This testbed is suitable for researchers whose work can be evaluated in an overlay mode.
For high-speed data-plane experiments, the ATCA programmable router [7] is ideal. These routers allow dataplane researchers to download code for functions such as packet scheduling, forwarding table lookups, etc., to network processors/FPGAs on the line cards for testing and evaluation.
In our virtualization approach, which uses off-the-shelf switches and routers, this level of programmability, i.e., support for code downloads, is not available. Nevertheless these switches offer researchers the ability to configure node operation via the CLI. Given the vast number of features implemented in commercial switches, such configurability access will open up several lines of experimental research.
We list several examples of the type of networking research (in data, control and management planes) possible with just such configurability access of switches: (1) data-plane research combining Weighted Random Early Discard (WRED) and transport protocols (WRED profiles can be set through the CLI), (2) data-plane research on QoS-support mechanisms, which, while limited by the capabilities of the switches, still offer much scope for experimental work to understand how these capabilities should be configured for desired operations, (3) data-plane research on security and access-control lists by configuring various parameters related to these functions, (4) control-plane research in connection-oriented networks for advancing signaling protocols, routing protocols, advancereservation schedulers, etc., as is being carried out on the CHEETAH [11] and DRAGON [12] testbeds, (5) controlplane research on routing protocols for IP networks, such as XORP [9] , (6) management-plane research on algorithms and open-source tools [13] , (7) measurement tools to estimate bandwidth, capacity, loss rates, and delay on end-to-end paths, such as those listed in [14] ; visibility to the switches and routers could open up a new set for innovations, as current tools operate without such access.
Given this rich set of experimental lines of work enabled by offering researchers configurability access to switches through the CLI, we found a broader motivation than our initial HOPIoriented driver for virtualizing off-the-shelf switches. Thus, even without the ability to download code to these switches, i.e., the "programmability" attribute defined in [1] , there is value in virtualizing off-the-shelf switches.
There is growing interest in the commercial sector among equipment vendors to support built-in capabilities for switch/router virtualization of all four levels (data, control, and management planes, and administrative access). Interestingly, new products are being created to virtualize both data-center switches [15] as well as high-end service-provider routers [16] , [17] . For example, various departments of an organization can share the computers and switches in an enterprise data center. As these switches become more widely available, based on their supported capabilities, our software will need to be adapted to offer researchers the required flexibility. Just as PlanetLab OS virtualizes hosts in an environment suitable for researchers in spite of the availability of commercial tools, e.g., VMware, we expect that researchers will need open-source software support for virtualization of commercial switches/routers, a gap filled by this work.
III. APPROACH FOR VIRTUALIZATION OF AN OFF-THE-SHELF ETHERNET SWITCH A. Virtualization architecture overview
In this section, we describe our approach for virtualizing an off-the-shelf Ethernet switch that has built-in support for sliver isolation on its data-plane interfaces. Fig. 1 shows our virtualization architecture. The Force10 E600 switch is used as an example of the type of commercial switch that can be virtualized with this approach.
First, we define a few terms. The term sliver is defined as a bandwidth partition on a port with a set of associated multiplexing/demultiplexing identifiers, e.g. VLAN identifiers. The term slice is used to represent a logical switch, which consists of a set of slivers on a specific set of ports of the physical switch. Our definition of the word "slice" is for a single switch, though this term has been used in the GENI community to represent a set of resources across a whole network (i.e., multiple switches). We decided to focus this paper on the virtualization problem for a single switch before tackling the broader problem of providing a researcher a virtual set of resources across a network of switches. Therefore, Fig.1 shows just a single switch and associated software. Some of the software modules, such as the slice scheduler, could be generalized for a network of switches. The next term we define is entity. This represents both a human administrator of a logical switch (slice) as well as software modules implemented by the slice owner to interface with the slice scheduler and Slice Administration Controller (SAC) of Fig. 1 , as these software modules offer both graphic and programmatic interfaces.
The main components of our virtualization software architecture are shown in Fig. 1 . As stated in Section I, multiple control-plane instances and management-plane instances are run outside the switches to provide corresponding functionality to the logical switches. Researchers access the slice scheduler (via a graphic or programmatic interface) to request reservations for switch slices for a fixed duration of time. The slice scheduler maintains reservations for discrete time periods (e.g., hourly basis). The slice scheduler translates a slice request into a set of required slivers, and checks whether the request can be accepted, based on resource availability in the requested time period. Sliver allocations for accepted reservations are written into the configuration database shown in Fig. 1 .
The last component of the virtualization software architecture shown in Fig. 1 is the Slice Administration Controller (SAC). The purpose of the SAC is to enable sharing of the administrative command-line interface. It is an important module to allow multiple researchers to configure operation of their logical switches, enabling the types of research listed in Section II-B.
In this first phase of the work, we focused on testing the switch data-plane mechanisms for sliver isolation, and implemented and evaluated the SAC. Therefore, in the following two subsections, we provide details on these two aspects of the overall architecture.
B. Data-plane support for sliver isolation
The Force10 E600 switch implements the IEEE 802.1Q standard, which is a multiplexing scheme based on 12-bit Virtual LAN identifiers (IDs) and the 3-bit priority field. We use the term "class" when referring to the latter because in the virtualization application all slivers are treated equally.
Force10's E600 switch implements a rich set of QoS features for traffic control on the date plane. These features include rate policing for ingress traffic, per-class queueing, rate limiting for egress traffic, and rate shaping. When a packet enters a port on a line card, it is first processed by a Flexible Packet Classification engine (FPC). The FPC examines information in the Ethernet, IEEE 802.1Q, and IP headers, and performs a lookup on a stored policy table to determine how this packet should be marked according to configured policies. After classification, the packet is processed using a two-rate three-color rate-policing mechanism [18] , and placed into one of the eight queues according to the policies installed by a switch administrator through the CLI. The service order of these queues is controlled by a scheduler according to a Weighted Fair Queueing (WFQ) algorithm. Packets are then served out of the queues and passed through a set of switch fabric cards to egress line cards. In the egress direction, packets are again placed into eight separate queues and processed by a two-rate three-color marking mechanism. The queues are serviced using a WFQ algorithm.
On each physical port, the administrator can use a ratepolicing command to control the operation of the two-rate three-color marking module in the ingress direction. A ratelimiting command can be applied to the same port for the operation of the two-rate three-color marking module in the egress direction. If packets are classified by VLAN ID, we can specify at most six rate-policing commands and/or six rate-limiting commands on each physical port in the E600 switch. Data-plane isolation is ensured by a combination of actions performed in these data-plane circuits, along with actions performed in the slice scheduler and SAC. The slice 
C. Slice Administration Controller (SAC)
The purpose of the SAC is to enforce that the instantiation of slices by entities is within the bounds the slice scheduler has assigned. In other words, the SAC makes sure an entity does not attempt to manipulate resources that have not been assigned to it by the slice scheduler. As shown in Fig. 1 , the SAC reads the configuration database, updated by the slice scheduler, to discover the resources to which each entity has access in each time interval. The SAC then checks commands issued from each entity. It screens each command to verify that it only requires operations on resources allocated to the slice granted to the corresponding command-issuing entity, and then passes on approved commands to the Ethernet switch. Responses are relayed from the switch back to the entity.
A slice allocation for a given time interval is represented as follows: (R, B, P, V), where (R = r e l , 1 ≤ l ≤ L, e E) is the set of requested rates on all the links of the switch, E is the set of entities, and L is the number of links (interfaces) on the switch. Similarly, the set of requested buffer sizers on all the links is represented by (B = b e l , 1 ≤ l ≤ L, e E). Sets P and V represent the set of class identifiers, and the set of VLAN IDs, respectively.
Slices allocated in a given time interval, T , will be assigned resources such that:
where E T ⊆ E presents the set of entities that requested slices in a given time interval, T, i = j, and C l and B l are the capacity of and buffer size associated with link l, respectively.
We show an example of slice allocations for one time interval in Table I . In this example, 2 entities are sharing this switch and the switch has 4 links. In Table 1 , since QoS functions can be applied to either classes or VLANs, but not both, the slice scheduler pre-determined that Link 1 and Link 3 Let us consider an example of how the SAC handles a command from an entity. Rate policing/limiting QoS commands specify a Committed Information Rate (CIR), and optionally Committed Burst Size (CBS), corresponding to the committed rate and committed burst size for a VLAN or a class. These commands are issued in "interface" mode, which means they apply to a specific interface. Let us represent such a command from entity e as (e:l, v, cir, cbr), where l identifies the interface, v, the VLAN ID, cir, the CIR value, and cbs, the CBS value. The SAC maintains a table of aggregate rates already assigned by each entity to VLANs and/or classes for all the links on the switch. We represent the aggregate rate assigned to already-configured VLANs by entity e on a VLAN-mode link l as A e l . We use the symbol D e l to represent the already-assigned total buffer space on link l by entity e. Upon receiving the command, the SAC first checks that link l is set to be shared in VLAN mode at this time interval. If it passes this test, it then subjects the command parameters to the following tests:
If these conditions are met, the SAC allows the command to be sent through to the switch. If not, the command is rejected.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENTS
We implemented the SAC software component of our virtualization architecture. In this section, we first describe design points, then the implementation of the SAC software component, and finally present our measurements of how much overhead the SAC introduces.
This case study proceeds from our initial motivation of virtualizing the common infrastructure of Force10 Ethernet switches in the HOPI testbed to enable concurrent controlplane instances to coexist. Specifically, this scenario involves using VLANs and rate policing/limiting for data-plane virtualization, no changes to the control plane, and an external program to virtualize a small set of administrative functions.
A. SAC Design
We now discuss some design criteria for the SAC. There were five distinct design goals relating to the SAC: resource control, transparency, security, performance, and reliability.
1) Resource control:
The primary function of the SAC is as described in Section III-C, to control access to switch resources. The SAC implementation must of course support this function.
2) Access Transparency: An entity is not generally aware that it is issuing commands to the SAC instead of to the switch directly. The SAC provides access transparency as opposed to content transparency. Full content transparency is not provided. By limiting the transparency, we can give an entity the illusion of a fully functional switch over which it has full control, rather than a shared switch over which it can only control some resources.
3) Security: The SAC software module serves as a intermediary between entities and the switch as shown in Fig.  1 , therefore communication into and out of the SAC must be secure. Access control to the SAC is limited only to authorized entities. The SAC holds the sole (with the exception of the switch owner) login to the switch. The resource control functions of the SAC provide a measure of security against unauthorized manipulation of resources at the switch. A compromised entity will be unable to effect other entities' experiments or any resources segmented off for production use.
4) Performance:
With the motivation of accommodating multiple control-plane software solutions that may be issuing commands to the SAC at a relatively high rate (compared to a human user), we have a goal of not paying too high a performance cost in terms of added delay in command processing. The SAC performs as little processing on incoming commands as possible and delivers return information from the switch without alteration or any processing at all, in order to keep the overhead from using the SAC low.
5) Reliability:
The SAC and the switch could potentially crash or be administratively reset. This introduces a risk of the SAC becoming out of synchronization with the state of the switch. In order to provide reliable enforcing of resource sets, upon initialization the SAC discovers the current state of resources by querying the switch.
B. Implementation 1) Setup:
The SAC is an application which is executed in lieu of a entity's shell in a Linux environment. A typical entry in /etc/passwd might end with :/bin/bash, so that upon login an instance of the bash shell is instantiated to receive commands from the entity. Instead, to use the SAC, the entry for an account ends with :/home/account/vr. Each entity that requires access to a switch is assigned its own separate account on a Linux machine. This scheme accomplishes several goals: 1) account management is performed on the Linux machine using the familiar account creation/deletion mechanisms 2) since each entity has its own account, each entity's resource set can be enumerated in a configuration file which resides in that account's home directory such as :/home/account/vr config 3) secure authentication is handled by the Linux system 4) with the shell effectively replaced by the SAC, no access to the Linux system is granted to the entity Each entity's vr config file is defined by the administrator and stored in that entity's home directory. Upon instantiation, the SAC initializes the appropriate resource set for that entity by reading in the values from vr config. These values would be obtained from the database shown in Fig. 1 if the complete virtualization architecture was implemented.
2) Operation: Once an entity has logged in to the Linux machine, and the SAC has initialized its values, according to Section IV-B1, the SAC securely connects to the switch using SSH2. The prompt (e.g., LOSA-Force10#) returned upon login to the switch is immediately passed to the entity by the SAC, so the entity is transparently presented with the command prompt from the switch upon logging into the Linux machine. The entity then issues commands which are terminated at the SAC. All commands issued from the entity, which deal with resources, are parsed and checked against the resource set in order to verify that the resource is able to be manipulated by the entity. If the command is acceptable (i.e., the resource specified in the command is contained in the entity's resource set), then the command is passed to the switch unchanged. If, however, the resource specified in the command is not in the entity's resource set, then the SAC prints an error message (e.g., % Error: Permission Denied for VLAN xx) and sends a single new-line character to the switch to cause a command prompt to be returned, which is then passed to the user.
3) Security: Security between the SAC and both the entities and switch is provided by SSH2 in our implementation. Specifically, the libssh2 [19] library is integrated into the SAC. In general, security between the entity and the Linux machine is dependent on which methods the administrator allows, though SSH2 is desired. Upon instantiation, the SAC attempts to connect using the SSH2 protocol to the switch with username/password authentication.
C. Measurements
We gathered measurements, presented in Table II , to discover the level of overhead from issuing commands through the SAC. Since the research entities we were supporting with the SAC could potentially be issuing commands at relatively high rates, the virtualize needs to not introduce unacceptably high delay for processing commands. The column marked Direct contains the delay for processing commands issued directly to the switch, not through the SAC. The column SAC shows delay for commands which were issued to the SAC. Entries in the table marked "NA" are not applicable since they correspond to functions where the SAC checks commands against a resource set, and this does not apply to a direct login session. Overall, the delay is acceptable relative to the research projects for which we designed the SAC.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a technique for virtualizing an off-the-shelf Ethernet switch, with built-in capabilities for isolating bandwidth partitions on its data-plane interfaces, using external software. Such virtualization would enable the sharing of a physical switch by multiple, concurrent research experiments, with each experiment being assigned its own logical switch. Even without the ability to download code into the switches (i.e., programmability), many experiments can be conducted by offering researchers the ability to configure logical switch operation through a shared access to the switch's administrative command-line interface (CLI). We demonstrated our approach by implementing a Slice Administration Controller that enables shared, but policed, access of the CLI, for the Force10 E600 system, configured as a Layer-2 (Ethernet) switch.
